In a formal model of firms hiring from a shared pool, there are conditions under which adopting a shared, more accurate screening algorithm is the dominant choice for both firms in a two-firm model yet lowers overall welfare compared with each firm using its own noisier judgement; under one standard ranking model (Plackett–Luce) the effect disappears.

SocioLens project,

Claim LD09-SL-C21 (v1.0)

Provenance and status

Claim type: Interpretation
Publication status: Eligible for publication, with qualifiers: interpretation label
Verification state: Checked against the primary source. Who checked this claim is not recorded for it; claim checks so far were AI-led, and no person has checked claims against their sources.
Does not license: Any estimate of how large the loss is in real markets
Limitations: Read in the arXiv version the authors mark as appearing in PNAS; the result depends on the noise model; the main theorem covers two firms, and settings with more firms are explored computationally
Source (as cited): Kleinberg & Raghavan, “Algorithmic monoculture and social welfare,” PNAS 118, 2021 (arXiv:2101.05853)
Source type: Peer-reviewed journal article (recorded as “Peer-reviewed journal article”)
Institutional position: Independent academic
Maturity of the evidence: Contested evidence
Recorded date: 15 October 2026
Currentness / correction: This is the current version. No correction or concern is recorded on its sources.

Sources this version cites

Kleinberg & Raghavan, “Algorithmic monoculture and social welfare,” PNAS 118, 2021 (arXiv:2101.05853) (Peer-reviewed journal article)
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Version

This page shows version v1.0. Its record never changes, even when newer evidence arrives; the site may add a note to the page or withhold a figure not cleared for public use.

This pinned version is also the current version.

Versions: v1.0 · current

Raw record: every recorded field, with its coded values

All 25 canonical Claim fields, verbatim, with the coded values derived from them. The plain-language labels above are read from these.

Claim type (coded): INTERPRETATION (as printed: “INTERPRETATION”)
Publication status (coded): ELIGIBLE (INTERPRETATION_LABEL) (as printed: “ELIGIBLE WITH INTERPRETATION LABEL”)
Verification state (coded): CONTENT_VERIFIED_PRIMARY
Source type (coded): PEER_REVIEWED_JOURNAL_ARTICLE
Maturity (coded): CONTESTED

#	Canonical field	Canonical value (verbatim)	Normalized (Claim Value Vocabulary v1.0.2)
1	CLAIM ID	LD09-SL-C21	—
2	PUBLIC-FACING CLAIM	In a formal model of firms hiring from a shared pool, there are conditions under which adopting a shared, more accurate screening algorithm is the dominant choice for both firms in a two-firm model yet lowers overall welfare compared with each firm using its own noisier judgement; under one standard ranking model (Plackett–Luce) the effect disappears.	—
3	CLAIM TYPE	INTERPRETATION	base_types: INTERPRETATION
4	RESEARCH STRAND	C — Systems, decisions and shared knowledge	—
5	MATURITY	CONTESTED	states: CONTESTED
6	SOURCE	Kleinberg & Raghavan, “Algorithmic monoculture and social welfare,” PNAS 118, 2021 (arXiv:2101.05853)	source_ids: SRC-SL-KLEINBERG-RAGHAVAN-PNAS-2021
7	SOURCE TYPE	Peer-reviewed journal article	classes: PEER_REVIEWED_JOURNAL_ARTICLE
8	INSTITUTIONAL POSITION	Independent academic	—
9	SCOPE	Stylized competitive hiring	—
10	DESIGN	Mathematical model with probabilistic rankings	—
11	SAMPLE / DATASET	Not applicable (theory)	—
12	MODEL / TOOL / VERSION	A shared algorithmic ranking compared with independent human rankings	—
13	COMPARATOR	Each firm using an independent, noisier ranking	—
14	MAIN RESULT	Theorem: for suitable noise models, using the algorithm is a strictly dominant strategy for both firms but social welfare would be higher if both used human evaluators; no effect under Plackett–Luce	—
15	INFERENTIAL TARGET	Whether individually rational adoption of a shared algorithm can be collectively costly	—
16	DOES NOT LICENSE	Any estimate of how large the loss is in real markets	—
17	VERIFICATION STATE	CONTENT VERIFIED	state: CONTENT_VERIFIED_PRIMARY · verified_by: UNKNOWN
18	LIMITATIONS	Read in the arXiv version the authors mark as appearing in PNAS; the result depends on the noise model; the main theorem covers two firms, and settings with more firms are explored computationally	—
19	CONTRADICTORY / SUPPORTING SOURCES	Monoculture defended: LD09-SL-C22	—
20	GEOGRAPHY / LANGUAGE	Not applicable / English	—
21	DISTRIBUTIONAL LEDGER	Applicants screened out by a shared algorithm may be screened out everywhere	—
22	R01 / FIELD-MAP LINKS	LD-09, D3	—
23	WHAT WOULD CHANGE THIS CLAIM?	Empirical estimates of welfare loss in real screening markets	—
24	PUBLICATION STATUS	ELIGIBLE WITH INTERPRETATION LABEL	state: ELIGIBLE · qualifiers: INTERPRETATION_LABEL
25	RECORDED DATE	2026-10-15	—

Field 22 references resolved against Field Map v0.2: LD-09 (LIVING_DEBATE); D3 (DOMAIN)

The sources as recorded, with their record IDs and coded source types:

Pinned Sources (field 6, version-specific)

“Kleinberg & Raghavan, “Algorithmic monoculture and social welfare,” PNAS 118, 2021 (arXiv:2101.05853)” → Kleinberg & Raghavan (2021), “Algorithmic monoculture and…” (SRC-SL-KLEINBERG-RAGHAVAN-PNAS-2021--v1.0) — Kleinberg & Raghavan, “Algorithmic monoculture and social welfare,” PNAS 118, 2021 (arXiv:2101.05853); class PEER_REVIEWED_JOURNAL_ARTICLE (explicit public provenance pin)

Cited by Living Debate versions

Individual gain, collective narrowing? Does AI make science, creative work and shared knowledge more alike? (v0.1) LD-09

Cite this page

SocioLens project. (2026, October 15). In a formal model of firms hiring from a shared pool, there are conditions under which adopting a shared, more accurate screening algorithm is the dominant choice for both firms in a two-firm model yet lowers overall welfare compared with each firm using its own noisier judgement; under one standard ranking model (Plackett–Luce) the effect disappears [Claim LD09-SL-C21, version v1.0]. SocioLens. https://sociolens-web.pages.dev/claims/ld09-sl-c21/v1.0/

@misc{sociolens_ld09_sl_c21_v1_0,
  author = {{SocioLens project}},
  title = {In a formal model of firms hiring from a shared pool, there are conditions under which adopting a shared, more accurate screening algorithm is the dominant choice for both firms in a two-firm model yet lowers overall welfare compared with each firm using its own noisier judgement; under one standard ranking model (Plackett–Luce) the effect disappears.},
  year = {2026},
  date = {2026-10-15},
  howpublished = {\url{https://sociolens-web.pages.dev/claims/ld09-sl-c21/v1.0/}},
  note = {Claim LD09-SL-C21, version v1.0}
}

The link points to this version, whose record never changes. For a finding, cite the original study as well: SocioLens summarizes research and does not replace it.

Research-of-record provenance

Materialized by sociolens-materializer 0.6.0 at 2026-09-28T20:00:00.000Z; normalization contract SocioLens — Claim Value Vocabulary v1.0.2 — Pre-Spike Materialization Contract (v1.0.2). Content seal SHA-256 3cfa7dbc0243225ecc3d6755cd7c8e834ce81cb45ba07a4fcfb121df431090bc.

Repository-authored inputs (not Drive exports)

SocioLens claim — LD09-SL-C21 v1.0 (v1.0) — written in the SocioLens repository by Project Lead (Claude, AI) on 2026-10-15; no Drive identity exists. Authority: AGENTS.md "Authority" (the Project Lead decides research content within the research-integrity rules) and the Owner's choice in the SocioLens project chat on 15 October 2026 to build the LD-09 debate; a new Claim, first version, written from the project's LD-09 source notes, checked against full texts or official abstracts. Block “ENTRY 21 — LD09-SL-C21” SHA-256 74a23270e57335a7629555713f0222676df68f68e5c39311312ff63ece9368a0; fixture fixtures/authored/claims/LD09-SL-C21--v1.0.

Builder decisions (not Drive data)

VERSION = v1.0 — basis: Claim version taken from the repository-authored claim fixture version (SocioLens claim — LD09-SL-C21 v1.0); the first version of a new Claim of the LD-09 debate
CURRENT_POINTER = true — basis: repository-authored claim "SocioLens claim — LD09-SL-C21 v1.0" (Project Lead (Claude, AI), 2026-10-15); basis: AGENTS.md "Authority" (the Project Lead decides research content within the research-integrity rules) and the Owner's choice in the SocioLens project chat on 15 October 2026 to build the LD-09 debate; a new Claim, first version, written from the project's LD-09 source notes, checked against full texts or official abstracts
FIELD_6_SOURCE_REFERENCE = SRC-SL-KLEINBERG-RAGHAVAN-PNAS-2021--v1.0 — basis: field 6 of ENTRY 21 — LD09-SL-C21 cites "Kleinberg & Raghavan, “Algorithmic monoculture and social welfare,” PNAS 118, 2021 (arXiv:2101.05853)"; the only field-6 segment of this ClaimVersion's repository-authored ledger block.
SOURCE_PROVENANCE_PIN = SRC-SL-KLEINBERG-RAGHAVAN-PNAS-2021--v1.0 — basis: explicit version-pinned public provenance of this ClaimVersion (Amendment v1.2 §6): the pinned field-6 Source record "Kleinberg & Raghavan, “Algorithmic monoculture and social welfare,” PNAS 118, 2021 (arXiv:2101.05853)".